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comment to the pre-1972 amendments stance of the Civil Rights Act
requiring equality of treatment. Thus, an employer no longer has to make a
showing of undue hardship; it need only show that accommodation will
require greater than de ninimis costs or "unequal" treatment of employees.
In so circumscribing the requirement, the Court nearly proclaims the amendment a nullity.
ELIZABETH L. MOORE

Commercial Law-Anticipatory Repudiation: A New Measure
of Buyers' Damages Under the Uniform Commercial Code
Measuring an aggrieved buyer's damages when a seller wrongfully
repudiates a contract before performance is due has long been considered a
troubling and complex task. I The complexity concerns, first, the time from
which damages should be measured if the buyer chooses not to purchase
substitute goods (cover) and, second, the application of the Uniform Commercial Code's concept of cover in determining this time. 2 Section 2-713 of
the Code, which sets forth the buyer's damages for nondelivery, states that
damages should be measured by calculating the difference between contract
3
price and market price at the time the buyer "learned of the breach. "
Section 2-610, however, indicates that if a seller repudiates before performance is due, an aggrieved buyer may await performance for a "commercially reasonable time" before taking any action. 4 Damages can be calculated
1. See, e.g., R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 149 (1970); J. WHITE &

R.

SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §

6-4 (1972).

2. U.C.C. § 2-712 provides:
"Cover"; Buyer's Procurement of Substitute Goods
(I) After a breach within the preceeding section the buyer may "cover" by
making in good faith and -without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or
contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller.
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between
the cost of cover and the contract price together with any incidental or consequential
damages as hereinafter defined (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not bar him from
any other remedy.
3. U.C.C. § 2-713 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price
(Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller is
the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the
breach and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages
provided in this Article (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the
seller's breach.
4. U.C.C. § 2-610 provides in pertinent part: "When either party repudiates the contract
with respect to a performance not yet due the loss of which will substantially impair the value of
the contract to the other, the aggrieved party may (a) for a commercially reasonable time await
performance by the repudiating party .... "
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with little difficulty if the buyer does cover.5 The buyer who does not cover,
however, is subjected to great uncertainty in damage measurement because
of the clash between the "learned of the breach" language of section 2-713
and the "commercially reasonable time" policy of section 2-610. The buyer
does not know if his damages will be measured in relation to market price at
the time he became aware of the seller's intent not to perform, or if he can
await performance and have damages measured by the market price at some
later date. The puzzle is made even more complex by the difference in
"learned of the breach" in section 2-713 and the use in section 2-723,
which details the measure of damages in anticipatory repudiation cases
coming to trial before time of performance, of the time the buyer "learned
6
of the repudiation."
In the recent case of Cargill,Inc. v. Stafford,7 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit offered a new solution to the puzzle by
holding that under section 2-713 a buyer may encourage the seller's performance for a reasonable time, but that at the end of that reasonable period
he should cover if substitute goods are readily available. The court stated
that if the buyer can readily cover and does not do so within a reasonable
time, damages should be based on the market price of the goods at the end of
the reasonable time rather than on the price when performance is due. s If,
however, the buyer has a valid reason for not covering, damages should be
9
calculated from the time when performance is due.
The court's opportunity to address the problem presented itself in a
case involving contracts for the sale of wheat. Cargill, the aggrieved buyer, 10 made two July telephone contracts with defendant-seller Stafford. On
August 24, plaintiff received written notice that defendant, objecting to
some provisions of the confirmations that plaintiff had mailed to him,
considered the contracts void and refused to perform. 1 Plaintiff continued
5. See note 2 supra.
6. U.C.C. § 2-723 provides in part:
(1) If an action based on anticipatory repudiation comes to trial before the time
for performance with respect to some or all of the goods, any damages based on
market price (Section 2-708 and 2-713) shall be determined according to the price of
such goods prevailing at the time when the aggrieved party learnedof the repudiation.

Id. (emphasis added); see R. NORDSTROM, supra note 1, § 149, at 455-56; J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 6-7, at 197-202.
7. 553 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1977).
8. Id. at 1227. The seller will be most likely to repudiate in a rising market; therefore, the
buyer's damages measured at this time will ordinarily result in lesser damages than those

measured at a later time.
9. Id. Colorado law governed the case; Colorado has adopted without change the

sections of the U.C.C. considered in the Cargill decision. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 4-2-610,
-708, -713, -723 (1973).

10. Plaintiff is a cash merchandiser in agricultural commodities. 553 F.2d at 1223.
11. Id. at 1226.
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to urge defendant to complete performance of the contract until there was a
final rebuff from defendant on September 6. Plaintiff then notified defendant that the contracts were cancelled. 12
In his suit for breach of contract, 13 plaintiff claimed that its damages
should be measured either by the difference between the contract price and
the market price on August 24, the date plaintiff received notice of defendant's definite repudiation of the contracts, or by the difference between the
contract price and the market price on September 30, the date performance
of the contract was due.1 4 The district court measured the damages using
September 6, the date of Stafford's final rebuff, as the date for determining
the market-contract price differential.15 The court of appeals, stating that the
16
district court "gave no reason for its selection of the September 6 date,"'
remanded the case to determine the correct date for measuring damages. In
doing so, the Tenth Circuit indicated that September 6 would be the correct
date only if Cargill did not have a valid reason for his failure or refusal to
cover, 7 but that September 30, the date performance was due, would be the
date from which to measure damages if Cargill had a valid reason for not
covering. 18
The court effectively interpreted the "learned of the breach" language
of section 2-71319 to mean the "time performance is due" since a buyer
would normally have a valid reason for not covering. 20 The court looked to
12. Id. at 1224.

13. Defendant had asserted that neither of the two contracts was enforceable under the
Statute of Frauds because he had made timely objection to the written confirmation sent to him
by the buyer. Id. at 1225. COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-201(2) (1973) states:

Between merchants, if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the
contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has
reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirement of subsection (1)of this
section against such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given
within ten days after it is received.
Stafford's statutorily required written objection to the second contract, however, did not reach
Cargill within the required 10 day period. 553 F.2d at 1225.
14. 553 F.2d at 1223.

15. Id.at 1225.
16. Id.

17. The court noted, "The record does not show that Cargill covered or attempted to
cover. Nothing in the record shows the continued availability or nonavailability of substitute
wheat." Id. at 1227.
18. Id.
19. See note 3 supra.

20. Courts have considered the validity of reasons for not covering when deciding
whether a buyer should be awarded consequential damages under U.C.C. § 2-715, quoted in
note 39 infra. These cases provide some examples of potentially valid excuses for not covering

in determining when to measure damages under the Cargill test. See, e.g., Lake Village

Implement Co. v. Cox, 252 Ark. 224, 478 S.W.2d 36 (1972) (failure to cover by procuring
substitute equipment excused when equipment for harvest not readily available and crop ready
for harvest); Gerwin v. Southeastern Cal. Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists, 14 Cal. App. 3d
209, 92 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1971) (plaintiff unable to cover because substitute items unavailable at
prices within his financial ability).
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the use of "repudiation" in section 2-72321 and reasoned that if the drafters

of the Code had intended "learned of the breach" in section 2-713 to mean
"learned of the repudiation," the word "repudiation" would have been
used. 22 The court also relied heavily on the common law tradition interpreting "learned of the breach" to mean "time performance is due.' '23 The
court's emphasis on cover does not, however, arise from any common law
tradition, but is instead an extension of the Code provisions concerning the
subject.
At common law, damages traditionally were measured by calculating
the difference between contract price and market price at the time performance was due. 24 Section 67(3) of the Uniform Sales Act, which codified the
common law approach, adopted this same measure?25 According to the
Restatement of Contracts, "[T]he rules for determining the damages recoverable for an anticipatory breach are the same as in the case of a breach at the
26
time fixed for performance."

Cargillfollows this pre-Code tradition in its determination that in cases
of anticipatory repudiation by the seller the buyer's damages are to be
measured by the contract-market price differential at the time performance
was due. This formulation represents a definite break from other post-Code
cases interpreting section 2-713, which generally have presumed that the
buyer learned of the breach when he learned of the seller's repudiation.27
21. See note 6 supra.
22. 553 F.2d at 1226.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see, e.g., MeJunkin Corp. v. North Carolina Natural Gas Corp., 300 F.2d 794, 801
(4th Cir. 1961), aff'd on rehearing, 300 F.2d 794 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 830 (1962)
(damages measured from the time performance due); Reliance Cooperage Corp. v. Treat, 195
F.2d 977, 982 (8th Cir. 1952) (reversing district court measurement of damages from the time of
repudiation in an anticipatory repudiation case); Continental Grain Co. v. Simpson Feed Co.,
102 F. Supp. 354, 363 (E.D. Ark. 1951), aff'd, 199 F.2d 284, 286 (8th Cir. 1952) (damages are
measured when performance is due; an aggrieved buyer "is not required to go upon the open
market and purchase upon receipt of notice that the seller does not intend to perform");
Comment, A Suggested Revision of the ContractDoctrine of Anticipatory Repudiation, 64
YALE L.J. 85, 92 n.40, 95 n.54 (1954).
25. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 67(3) states:
Where there is an available market for the goods in question, the measure of
damages, in the absence of special circumstances showing proximate damages of a
greater amount, is the difference between the contract price and the market or current
price of the goods at the time or times when they ought to have been delivered, or, if
no time was fixed, then at the time of the refusal to deliver.
26. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 338 (1932).

27. See Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1977); Maxwell v.
Norwood Marine, Inc., 19 U.C.C. Rep. 829 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
Many commentators have ignored or failed to recognize the inconsistencies inherent in § 2713. See, e.g., Hey, Remedies for Breach of Sales Contract Underthe Code, 7 WASHBURN L.J.
35 (1957); Small, The Remedy Provisions of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Practical Orientation, 4 GONZ. L. REv. 176 (1969).
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Damages then were measured by calculating the difference between the
28
contract price and the market price at the time of the seller's repudiation.
There is no suggestion in those cases that a damage calculation should be
based on the time performance was due.
In its interpretation, the Cargillcourt depended chiefly upon White and
Summers, 29 who strongly urge that "learned of the breach" in section 2-713
means "time performance is due" and conclude that the Code should not be
interpreted in a manner that changes pre-Code law without a more definite
statement that clearly indicates the change. 30 Cargill'sutilization of the time
performance was due as the time from which to measure damages was
conditioned upon a finding that the aggrieved buyer had a valid reason for
failing or refusing to cover. 31 Here the common law provided little guidance. Pre-Code decisions did not require or even encourage an aggrieved
buyer to purchase substitute goods. If he chose, a buyer could cover and
ordinarily recover the difference between the contract price and the substitute price if he used reasonable care in making his substitution. 32 If,
however, the price the buyer paid for cover exceeded the court's determination of the market price at the time performance was due, the buyer had to
33
absorb the additional loss.
The Code statutorily recognizes and places new emphasis upon the
concept of cover. Karl Llewellyn, chief reporter for the Code, 34 wanted to
require cover whenever possible.3 5 The Code itself, however, although
28. In a case relied upon in Cargill, Oloffson v. Coomer, II Ill.
App. 3d 918, 296 N.E.2d

871 (1973), cited at 553 F.2d at 1226, however, the court considered times other than repudiation for the purpose of measuring damages. Although the Coomer court calculated damages

based on the time of repudiation, id. at 921, 296 N.E.2d at 873, it also took into account the
commercially reasonable time requirement of § 2-610 in its decision that in this case damages
measured from the time of repudiation also met the commercially reasonable time requirement.
The Coomer court reasoned that because the spller's statement was an unequivocal repudiation
and cover was easily obtained, it would have been unreasonable for the buyer to await

performance. Id. at 922, 296 N.E.2d at 874. Cargillis consistent with Coomer in this respect,
but goes beyond Coomer by suggesting a time from which to measure damages if the buyer has
a valid excuse for not covering. 553 F.2d at 1227.

29. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1,§ 6-7, at 198-202.
30. Id. § 6-7, at 201-02.
31. 553 F.2d-at 1227.
32. See, e.g., Hosiery Co. v. Cotton Mills, 140 N.C. 452, 53 S.E. 140 (1906).

33. See, e.g., Missouri Furnace Co. v. Cochran, 8 F. 463 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1881).
34. The history of the Code is described in Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation
and Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1967). Llewellyn
wrote of the "democratic process" that produced the Code "over a period of more than fifteen

years, out of the labors of more than fifteen hundred skillful lawyers" in Llewellyn, Why We
Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 367, 374 (1957).
35. Llewellyn set forth his reasoning in REVISED UNIFORM SALES Acr § 58-A, Comment
(Second Draft, 1941):

If there should be real desire to give effect to the principle frequently announced by
the Courts, that "one party to a contract will not be allowed to speculate upon the
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clearly favoring cover, does not expressly require that a buyer make a
substitute purchase. Furthermore, none of the Code's scattered references
and comments related to cover indicate that, in cases of anticipatory repudiation, the time from which damages are measured should be determined by
reference to whether a buyer could have covered. Section 2-711, a catalogue
of buyers' remedies, states that the buyer may cover or recover damages
under 2-713.36 Section 2-712, the primary Code provision concerning cover, states that a buyer "may" cover; the official comment to this section
stresses that "the buyer is always free to choose between cover and damages
for non-delivery." 37 The final comment to section 2-713 states, "[T]he
present section provides a remedy which is completely alternativeto cover
....
"38 The only indication in the Code that the buyer might suffer if he
does not cover is section 2-715(2)'s assertion that consequential damages
39
might be limited by a party's failure to cover.
Although the Code does not expressly require cover, the combination
and effects of available remedies may make the procurement of cover a
practical necessity for the buyer, particularly if the buyer's damages are to
be measured at the time of repudiation. Use of this time to measure damages
gives the repudiating seller a commanding position because he can choose
the time of repudiation and therefore dictate the time at which damages will
be measured. n0 Typically, the buyer will cover and damages will be measother," the measure for the purpose would be a provision, in regard at least to
anticipatory breach, whereby the party in breach could require the aggrieved party, by

demand, to resort to cover or cancel without liability, within a reasonable time after
such demand. Inability to effect cover after reasonable effort would of course not in
any manner impair the common remedies of the aggrieved party.
36. U.C.C. § 2-711 provides in part:
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully
rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods involved, and

with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract (Section 2-612), the
buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may in addition to recovering so
much of the price as has been paid

(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to all the goods
affected whether or not they have been identified to the contract; or

(b) recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this Article (Section 2-713).
37. Id. § 2-712, Comment 3.
38. Id. § 2-713, Comment 5 (emphasis added).

39. Id. § 2-715(2) provides in part: "Consequential damages resulting from the seller's
breach include (a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which

the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be
prevented by cover or otherwise ....

"

40. See, e.g., Anderson, Repudiation of a ContractUnderthe Uniform Commercial Code,
14 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1964); Squillante, Sales Law in Iowa Under the Uniform Commercial
Code-Article 2, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 1 (1970). Anderson's article, which presumes that the

buyer's damages are to be measured at the time of repudiation, is the strongest statement of this
position:
The new formula diminishes the value of [the buyer's] action for damages: he recovers

the amount that the market price has increased between the date of the contract and

376

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

ured under section 2-712.41 The buyer, however, cannot be certain how his
damages will be measured if he does not cover. 2 There is very little case
law in this area upon which the buyer can rely.43 There is not even
agreement about whether cover must be used as a measure of damages if it is
obtained, or whether the buyer procuring cover retains an option to bring
suit for damages.' Furthermore, commentators on the Code disagree about
45
the propriety of a requirement of cover.
Cargillclearly places cover in a critical position. In Cargill, the entire
measure of damages hinges on whether a contract for substitute goods could
have been made. Under the test suggested by the court, measurement of
damages will vary widely, depending upon the acceptability of the buyer's
excuse for not procuring cover. 46 If the buyer has no acceptable excuse, his
damages are measured by the difference between the contract price and the
market price at the end of a "reasonable time." 47 If measured at this time,
the date of the repudiation, and an alert seller can make that difference small or
nothing by repudiating immediately after a price rise appears to be likely. This
deterioration to the point of worthlessness in the buyer's action for damages practically compels him to resort to the remedy of "cover."
Anderson, supra at 18-19.
41. See note 2 supra.
42. One commentator blames these uncertainties on the general attitude of the Code
draftsmen towards damages, pointing out that the Code makes every effort to protect reasonable investments actually made in the market, but that "the Code shifts about, erratically
and unpredictably, when damages are to be measured by a market to which the complainant has
had no recourse. It is almost as if the draftsmen felt that such a remedy was in any case so
undeserving that its precise statement became unimportant." Peters, Remedies for Breach of
ContractsRelating to the Sale of Goods Underthe Uniform CommercialCode: A Roadmap for
Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 267 (1963).
43. Oloffson v. Coomer, 1111. App. 3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871 (1973), discussed in note 28
supra, is the only case (other than Cargill)that discusses at length an interpretation of § 2-713 in
connection with anticipatory repudiation when the buyer does not cover. Other cases determining when damages should be measured under § 2-713 generally choose the time of the seller's
repudiation without any detailed discussion. See Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d
967, 971 (4th Cir. 1977) (date of seller's repudiation presumed to be correct date for damage
measurement); Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781, 800 (5th Cir. 1973)
(comparison of § 2-713 with pre-Code Texas law stating damages measured at time and place of
breach); Maxwell v. Norwood Marine, Inc., 19 U.C.C. Rep. 829,831 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div.
1976) (damages refused to buyer because of no evidence on exact date he learned of seller's
repudiation); Sawyer Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Linke, 231 N.W.2d 791,795 (N.D. 1975) (acceptance of repudiation not necessary to effectuate breach); Tennell v. Esteve Cotton Co., 546
S.W.2d 346, 356 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976) (buyer learned of the breach when seller repudiated).
44. See Maxwell v. Norwood Marine, Inc., 19 U.C.C. Rep. 829 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div.
1976).
45. Compare 1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1.4403, at 249 (1964) and R. NORDSTROM, supra note 1,§ 145, at 445 n.88 (Code does not
require cover) with J.WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 6-4, at 191 n.77 (practical necessity

for cover under the Code).
46. 553 F.2d at 1227. The court does not discuss what an acceptable excuse would be.
Earlier cases indicate that a wide variety of reasons are acceptable. See note 20 supra.
47. 553 F.2d at 1227. This presumably corresponds with § 2-610's "commercially reasonable time." See note 4 supra.
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the damages would be likely to correspond closely with the damages
assessed in cases in which the buyer does cover, because substitute goods
must be procured within a commercially reasonable time. The buyer with an
acceptable excuse for not covering would measure his damages in relation to
the market price when performance was due. Any correspondence between
this measure of damages and damages in cases in which the buyer does
cover would be fortuitous.
The interpretation chosen by the Cargillcourt is not, however, the only
alternative interpretation of section 2-713's language and the concept of
cover. Nordstrom stresses a reconciliation of the Code sections concerning
anticipatory repudiation and concludes that the aggrieved buyer's damages
in such cases should be measured at a reasonable time after the repudiation.4" This reasonable time, which takes section 2-610 into account, 49
would be such time after the repudiation as would allow the buyer to
contract for substitute goods.5" In a period of fluctuating market value, the
buyer would not be at the mercy of a seller who could choose the time of
repudiation. Nor would the buyer be able to speculate at the seller's expense
by determining whether he could more profitably cover or collect damages,
51
since the two figures would correspond closely.
The choice between the various analyses of section 2-713 would be
difficult even if only historical considerations and the "commercially reasonable time" requirement of section 2-610 were weighed in the balance.
The language of section 2-723(1), however, requires that the time of the
seller's repudiation be used to calculate damages in cases of anticipatory
repudiation that come to trial before the time of performance. 52 This requirement provides a simple method for determining what the market price would
be at the time of performance-a time that, in the situation addressed by
section 2-723, would not yet have arrived. If one interprets "learned of the
breach" in section 2-713 to mean the time of "repudiation" as used in
section 2-723, however, the aggrieved buyer is foreclosed from awaiting the
seller's performance for a "commercially reasonable time," a privilege the
buyer has under section 2-610. Therefore, an analysis equating "learned of
48. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 1,§ 149, at 455.

49. See note 4 supra.
50. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 1, § 149, at 455. White and Summers reject this explanation as doing more violence to the language of § 2-713 than their conclusion. J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 6-7, at 201 n.108; see Leibson, Anticipatory Repudiationand Buyer's
Damages-A Look Into How the U.C.C. Has Changed the Common Law, 7 UNIFORM COM.
CODE L.J. 272 (1975).
51. See note 55 infra.
52. See note 6 supra.
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the breach" with "time of repudiation" in section 2-723 merely shifts the
53
focus of the inconsistencies.
The Code's internal inconsistencies, 54 the lack of a strong interpretive
trend in court decisions, and disagreement among major Code commentators all make it difficult to determine a buyer's damages in cases of
anticipatory repudiation. The strength of the Cargill court's conclusion
depends upon the interpretation of the purpose of section 2-713. If the
section is Viewed as blending with and supporting the other sections of the

Code concerning anticipatory repudiation, the "time the buyer learned of
the breach" should correspond closely with the time required for procuring
cover. 55 If, however, the relationship between section 2-713 and the other
Code sections is not considered paramount, the pre-Code formula equating
"time the buyer learned of the breach" with "time performance is due" is

more logical. 56 The Tenth Circuit believed that the section was not meant to
change the common law and its statutory statement in section 67(3) of the
Uniform Sales Act 57 and accordingly tied its conclusion to pre-Code considerations, 58 rejecting the rather weak trend of post-Code cases of deter53. The Cargillcourt believed that the use of "repudiation" in § 2-723 and "learned of the
breach" in § 2-713 indicated that the two expressions referred to two different times. 553 F.2d
at 1226. Most commentators, however, begin with the presumption that the "breach" of § 2-713
refers to the same time as the "repudiation" of § 2-723 and then try to reconcile the two. See R.
NORDSTROM, supra note 1, § 149, at 455 (since § 2-723 measures damages from time of
repudiation when case comes to trial before performance is due, "time of performance" would
be used when the case comes to trial after performance is due); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 1, § 6-7, at 199 (cautions against overstressing the importance of § 2-723); Peters, supra
note 42, at 265 (§ 2-723 relates only to evidentiary difficulties); Comment, supra note 24, at 104
(poses interpretation of § 2-723 that would make the section repugnant to basing damages for
anticipatory repudiation on a time other than when performance is due). Section 2-610 must
weigh more heavily in the balance, however, in interpreting § 2-713 than does § 2-723. R,
NORDSTROM, supra § 149, at 455; Liebson, supra note 50, at 281; Comment, supra at 104.
54. The harshest indictment of the inconsistency of Code language is found in Mellinkoff,
The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 185 (1967). This article,
however, does not specifically address § 2-713 problems.
55. Presumably the damages figures would closely correspond because the calculations of
the contract-market price differential would use approximately the same time period in measuring damages. Thus, if the buyer covers (something he must do without unreasonable delay), the
cover price will be used in determining damages. If, however, the buyer does not cover, the
price at the time he should have covered (at the end of a reasonable time after learning of
repudiation) will be used.
56. If Code considerations were put aside, the reasons for following common law tradition
would be even stronger as both a desire for consistency in measurement and the strength of the
long tradition would point towards continuing the common law interpretation.
57. 'See note 25 supra.
58. Various authorities have put forth theories about the purpose of § 2-713 that offer a
wide range of interpretive possibilities. Peters suggests in her article that it could be interpreted
as a statutory liquidated damages clause. Peters, supra note 42, at 259. One commentator
suggests that § 2-713 was not intended by the draftsmen to apply to situations of anticipatory
breach, but "was drafted to meet those instances where the buyer does not learn of the breach
until after the date of performance." Comment, supra note 24, at 103. White and Summers
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mining anticipatory repudiation damages in relation to the contract-market
59
differences at the time of the seller's repudiation.
The Cargill decision accomplishes two things. At the very least, it
analyzes carefully the phrase "learned of the breach" as it relates to the
concept of cover. This fact in itself would separate the case from other
decisions that ordinarily presume that "learned of the breach" means time
of repudiation. 60 The decision should also clearly illustrate to the Permanent
Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code 61 that the problems long
discussed by Code commentators are now resulting in widely divergent
judicial opinions. 62 The Code itself was drafted in order to establish simplicity, clarity and uniformity of law. 63 These goals are not being realized in
those cases when sellers repudiate before time of performance has arrived
and the buyer does not cover. Cargill is an attempt at clarification, but no
court can reconcile the language of section 2-713 and the sections that
specifically discuss anticipatory repudiation until the purpose of section 2713 is further explained.
The Cargill decision adds to the uncertainty by making an acceptable
excuse for not covering the determinant in setting the time from which to
measure damages.64 The buyer must be concerned not only with when his
damages will be measured under the Cargill formula, but also with what
will be considered a valid reason for not covering. The only reasonable
escape for the buyer from this maze of uncertainties is to cover and have
damages measured according to section 2-712.65 For the buyer who does not
agree with this theory, adding that perhaps it is to induce the buyer to cover. J. WHITE & R.

SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 6-7, at 199, 205. Nordstrom is less kind to the draftsmen, stating that
"it looks as if the problem of measuring damages following a repudiation was either not
considered by the drafters or was considered on different occasions and resolved differently

each time it was considered." R. NORDSTROM, supra note 1, § 149, at 455-56.
59. 553 F.2d at 1226.

60. Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1977); Maxwell v. Norwood
Marine, Inc., 19 U.C.C. Rep. 829 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
61. 1961 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS SEVENTIETH YEAR

166 indicates the board is to consider proposed amendments when "(a) It has been shown by

experience under the Code that a particular provision is unworkable or for any other reason
obviously requires amendment; or (b) Court decisions have rendered the correct interpretation
of a provision of the Code doubtful and an amendment can clear up the doubt .... "

62. Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1977), which calculated
damages in an anticipatory breach case from the date of repudiation, was decided only a few
months before Cargill.It represents the opposite extreme (from time performance was due) in
setting the time for measuring damages.
63. See U.C.C. § 1-102.
64. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
65. The buyer, of course, could escape the maze by circumventing it completely. Detailed
drafting of the contract could include a provision stating when the market price is to be
determined in a situation of anticipatory breach by the seller in which the buyer does not cover.
U.C.C. § 1-102(3) provides that the provisions of the Code may be "varied by agreement."
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cover, however, a more faithful interpretation of the language of the Code
would keep cover as a choice, not as an integral determinant of damage
measurement.
Pre-Code law favored a method for calculating damages that could be
applied in all cases. 66 Perhaps this policy of uniformity should also help
determine the direction of post-Code decisions. At interpretation of section
2-713's "learned of the breach" to mean that an aggrieved buyer who does
not cover would also "learn" of the breach at the end of the same time
period he would have had to procure cover would serve a dual purpose. It
would reconcile section 2-713 with the basic policy of allowing a buyer a
"commercially reasonable time" before taking any action and, in contrast
to Cargill, would be more likely to yield the same amount in damages as
when the buyer covered. In this way, the courts would be upholding an
important traditional purpose of damage measurements while resting their
decisions on Code considerations and policies.
CARLYN GRAU POOLE

Criminal Law-Polygraph Examination Results Admissible in
Post-Conviction Hearings
Despite the widespread use of and reliance upon the polygraph or "lie
detector"' in nonjudicial and pretrial investigations, 2 courts have regarded
the polygraph with suspicion. Polygraph examination results have been
barred from most courts in the United States 3 on the ground that such
66. See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
1. The polygraph, commonly called a "lie detector," is designed to monitor and measure
certain physiological responses of a person who is answering a set of "yes" or "no" questions.
The device consists of three basic parts: (1) a "pneumograph tube" which is fastened around
the subject's chest to record respiration; (2) a blood pressure cuff to record pulse and blood
pressure; and (3) electrodes fastened to the hands or fingers through which an imperceptible
electric current passes in order to record galvanic skin response. The instrument produces an
electromechanical recording of unconscious physiological changes theoretically produced by
internal stress caused by an examinee's conscious insincerity. The polygraph examiner's expert

opinion regarding his examinee's sincerity is based on his analysis of the recording and other
circumstances of the examination. See generally 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 999 (J.Chadbourn rev. 1970 & Supps. 1975 & 1977).
2. See, e.g., People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 313, 235 N.W.2d 581, 584-85 (1975)

(Michigan Supreme Court took judicial notice of investigative usefulness of polygraph).
3. E.g., Marks v. United States, 260 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 929
(1959); People v. York, 174 Cal. App. 2d 305, 344 P.2d 811 (1959). But see United States v.

